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Abstract   
 
The independence of non-executive directors has long been a concern. The independent directors are not only 
required to be independent from management but also free from any other relationships which can interfere with 
their objectivity. Recently, the concern has been focused on long tenure of independent directors. Regulators 
seem to believe that long tenure may impair independence, hence attempts to limit the tenure have been 
recommended, even though it has not been made mandatory. However, theories concerning long tenure are 
contradictory and empirical evidences are weak. Earlier studies are based on theory-driven approach, which 
only examines the association between directors’ tenure and proxies of financial reporting quality. This study on 
the other hand, proposes a different approach based on earnings response coefficient model which not only 
examines investors’ perceptions but also their reactions. This is based on the widely accepted independence 
model where independence should not only be in the form of fact but also appearance. The interaction between 
directors’ tenure and earnings performance is hypothesized to have a significant negative relationship with the 
cumulative abnormal return. Low perceived earnings quality in financial accounts from long tenure by investors 
is expected to result in lower coefficient of earnings. This study will provide additional literature and knowledge 
on the effect of independent directors’ tenure. It can assist regulators in revising the requirement for directors’ 
tenure.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Released in March 2012, the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG 2012) focuses on the 
independence of independent directors, among other things. One of the recommendations is Recommendation 
3.2 which is to limit the services of independent directors to a maximum of nine years. Upon the completion of 
nine years, the independent directors are then re-designated as non-independent directors. However, 
Recommendation 3.3 allows for more than nine years but must justify and seek shareholders’ approval. The 
rationale in the limitation of tenure is that long tenure can impair the directors’ independence. As argued by 
Vafeas (2003), long tenure creates close relationships between the independent directors with the management 
and therefore, is more likely to befriend the managers. The attempt to limit the tenure can also be observed in 
other jurisdictions and similar to Malaysia, the “comply or explain” model is also applied in many other 
jurisdictions.  For example, the European Commission recommends for three terms or twelve years while, in the 
United Kingdom, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code sets a maximum tenure of nine years, which is also 
similar to Hong Kong and Singapore in Hong Kong, but in French, twelve years is the recommended maximum 
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tenure. Meanwhile, in India, the Companies Act, 2013 sets a maximum of two tenures of five consecutive years, 
with a cooling off period of three years. However, in the U.S, public companies do not have specific tenure 
limits for the independent directors.  
 
As the recommendations set out in MCGC 2012 are not made mandatory, hence long tenure can be considered a 
common practice in Malaysian public listed companies. This can be observed from a few reports conducted 
earlier, for example in a study by KPMG Malaysia (2013) of the top 300 companies ranked by market 
capitalisation in 2013, it had found that 33% of independent directors have served for more than 9 years. It is 
also reported that the average tenure of independent non-executive directors is 7.6 years, while on the other 
hand, only 6.6 years by non-executive non-independent directors. In another study, the Bursa Malaysia’s 
Analysis of Corporate Governance Disclosures in Annual Reports of 2012-2013 (2014) of 300 listed companies 
had found that 55% (165 companies) retains at least one independent non-executive director beyond the 9 years 
tenure. Based on top 100 Malaysian companies, the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)’s 2015 
survey had found increasing percentage of companies that have directors over 9 years from 34% in 2012 and 
38% in 2013 to 46% in 2014. In 2015 about 44% of those companies have directors retained over 9 years. 
However, average tenure of 6 years for 2013 to 2015 is lower from 7 years recorded in 2012. Meanwhile, based 
on all listed companies, more than 50% of companies have an independent director with the tenure of more than 
9 years, except for 2013 of only 47%. In an earlier report by Hay Group (2012) of 50 largest companies in 2010 
by ASEAN countries showed that the median tenure of independent directors of 6 years in Malaysia is longer 
than 4.5 years in Indonesia and 3 years in Thailand, but shorter than 7 years in Singapore. 
 
The debate on directors’ independence or broader aspects; board of directors independence, is not new as can be 
observed from the literature. This issue can be traced back from the argument regarding the need for the 
inclusion of non-executive directors as board members (Fama, 1983; Fama & Jensen, 1983) to the recent issue; 
which is the independence of independent directors. As the highest authority in a company, the board is 
mandated by the shareholders to protect their interests by ensuring all the activities of the company are for the 
benefits of the company. The popular belief is that directors whom are truly independent are effective monitors. 
Currently, Chapter 15 of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements requires at least two or one third of the board 
of directors to consist of independent directors and for audit committee, the minimum composition is three, 
consisting all non-executive directors and a majority of independent directors. Consistent with other countries, 
the Bursa Malaysia has defined the independent director as a director who is independent of management and 
free from any business or other relationships which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement 
or the ability to act in the best interests of the company. More specifically, as in Chapter 1.01 Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements, an independent director should not be an executive director, an officer within the last two 
years, a major shareholder, family member of any executive directors, officer or major shareholder, acting as a 
nominee or representative of any executive director or major shareholder, engage as adviser or is partner, 
director (except for independent director) or major shareholder of corporation which provides professional 
advisory services and engaged in any transaction individually or as partner, director or major shareholder of a 
corporation (other than subsidiaries of the company). However, the Listing Requirements is silent on directors’ 
tenure. 
 
This study examines the effect of independent directors’ tenure on the financial reporting quality based on the 
investors’ perspective. By using the earnings response coefficient model proposed by Houlthausen & Verrochia 
(1988), this study intends to not only examine investors’ view but also their reactions. This study is important 
considering long tenure of directors is common, not only in Malaysia but also elsewhere. It is relevant for the 
regulators in reviewing the current policy which then may enhance investors’ confidence towards the capital 
market and provides empirical evidence on the currently debated issue on limiting independent directors’ tenure.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Board of directors 
 
Managers are appointed as agents to act on behalf of shareholders in managing a corporation. This separation 
between owners and management causes conflicts of interest between the two parties, where the managers’ 
preferences are not aligned with the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Board of 
directors is a market solution to ameliorate this agency problem (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), whereby as the 
highest authority in the corporate structure, the board is discharged with the responsibility of monitoring and 
controlling the management. Besides that, the board is also responsible to make decisions relating to policy of 
the corporation, strategic planning and the appointment, dismissal and compensation of management (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). They receive those powers from shareholders with the purpose to protect their interests. 
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Limbasiya (2013) points out the role of board as to maximize the total value for investors, customers, 
employees, government, society and other stakeholders. It is common nowadays to observe that board of 
directors consists of a mixture of top management, largest shareholders or its representative and a few 
individuals unrelated to the company of shareholders. Appropriate composition of members in terms of 
demographic, skills, expertise, experience, value system enhances the effectiveness of the board and this 
diversity safeguards them against single minded group thinking (Limbasiya, 2013). As not involved in the 
management, the inclusion of the outside directors is believed to enhance the monitoring and controlling. The 
non-executive directors have the incentive to build reputations as expert monitors (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). 
 
2.2  Directors Independence 
 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) argued that the major conflict within the boardroom is between the CEO and the 
other directors. The CEO is argued to have the incentive to capture the board of directors, so as to secure his 
position and remuneration. On the other hand, the non-executive directors is expected to provide the relevant 
“check and balance” to the executives, the off-repeated mantra worldwide. However, with the growing number 
of corporate scandals, the effectiveness of non-executive directors in monitoring the management has become an 
issue. One main centre of discussion is the independence of these directors. This is because in discharging their 
responsibility requires them to have a different perspective from management and sometimes to challenge the 
management. The traditional two-way classification scheme of insider (management) and outsider (non-
management) directors fails to consider the potential conflicts of interest when directors are not employees but 
have other affiliations with the firm (Byrd & Hickman, 1992). Although non-executive directors are not 
involved in the management or the company, they may not be independent due to their indirect relations to 
management which can interfere with their objectivity. Therefore, it is believed that the non-executive directors 
are only able to perform more objectively if they are free from any personal bias resulting from financial or 
personal relationships with the management (Beasley, 1996; Carcello & Neal, 2000, 2003). Hence, it can be 
observed that the current requirement in many jurisdictions has differentiated the non-executive directors into 
non-independent non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors. The widely practiced, non-
executive directors whom are representative of the substantial shareholders or is related to the founder, 
controlling shareholder or managing directors and the founder of company, have been classified as non-
independent directors.  
 
Independence is widely recognized as one of the main criteria for quality monitoring and control. As responsible 
for oversight, board of directors needs to adopt a probing attitude, questioning management’s judgments and to 
take positions that variance with the management (McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996). Independence allows the 
committee to deliver its responsibilities objectively (Mohamad & Sori, 2001). The independent director is 
expected to play two-fold role; as a strategic advisor and protecting the minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders’ rights (Limbasiya, 2013). However, Mirvis & Savitt (2016) theorized that the independent 
directors lack detailed operational knowledge and firm specific commitment. The composition of the committee 
is one important determinant of its ability to act independently (Scarborough, Rama & Raghunandan, 1998), 
whereby the inclusion of more independent directors on the board is believed to enhance board independence.  
 
The typical independent director definition ignores the possibility that independence is based on a director’s 
personal profile and the relationships created in the boardroom over time (Byrd & Cooperman, 2010). 
Therefore, the current concern on directors’ independence is long tenure of independent directors which have 
been debated to impair their independence. Regulators’ action worldwide is to relegate the status of independent 
directors to non-independent after a period. Their action is being related to the belief that long tenure may 
impair directors’ independence. As noted by Romanchek & Keckley (2014) long tenure directors can become 
too close to long services CEO (and with other managers), become stagnate in the role or become too 
comfortable and not ask the difficult questions. Friendliness hypothesis proposed by Vafeas (2003) views long 
tenure directors as more likely to befriend managers which then can impair their independence and thus, 
objectivity. Long tenure is an obstacle to achieve board diversity. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
It is widely recognized that the independence of monitoring is not only important in terms of fact, but also in 
appearance. The fact that stakeholders cannot directly observe the work of independent directors, it is important 
for the directors at least to be seen as independent. It can be observed that predictions regarding the effects of 
independent director’s tenure on their effectiveness as monitors seem to contradict. Based on the theory of 
organizational behaviour, longer tenure increases an individual’s commitment (Buchanan, 1974). At the same 
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time, the expertise hypothesis views that longer tenure increases directors’ experience and specific knowledge 
about the corporation (Vafeas, 2003). Sharma & Iselin (2012) argued that in an efficient market for directors, 
long tenure directors have higher incentives to protect shareholders’ interest in order to maintain their seats. 
Long service directors have high reputation developed over time and therefore, less likely to be associated to 
anything that will dramatically impair their reputation (Liu & Sun, 2010). At the same time, Persons (2015) 
argued that lack of seniority has an adverse effect on directors’ ability to scrutinize top management. Other 
versions view that the effectiveness of independent directors deteriorates with the tenure. Friendliness 
hypothesis proposed by Vafeas (2003) views long tenure directors are more likely to befriend managers which 
then can impair their independence and thus, objectivity. As noted by Romanchek & Keckley (2014) long tenure 
directors can become too close to long services CEO (and with other managers), become stagnate in the role or 
become too comfortable and not ask the difficult questions. Newly appointed directors have also been argued to 
have incentives to signal their expertise as monitors to the market (Sharma & Iselin, 2012). At the same time, 
Liu & Sun (2010) postulated that by having new directors can bring fresh ideas and critical thinking to the 
board. By having a new director may safeguard against single minded group thinking. 
 
Mixed findings can also be observed on the effect of tenure on directors’ effectiveness as monitors. A study by 
Sharma & Iselin (2012) had found that the average tenure of audit committees is positively related to 
misstatements. It is also found that short tenure (less than four years) and long tenure (more than eight years) are 
positively related to misstatements and the study concluded that the optimum director tenure is between 4 to 8 
years. Vafeas (2003) found that increase in mean tenure is associated with greater incidence of negative earnings 
avoidance.  Meanwhile, Rickling (2014) found that long tenure is positively associated with the likelihood of a 
firm repeatedly meeting or just beating analysts forecast. On the other hand, Liu & Sun (2010) and He & Yang 
(2014) both had found that long tenure is negatively associated with earnings management which the studies 
relate to the increase in directors’ expertise. 
 
One main responsibility of independent directors is to monitor the financial reporting process. Even though, 
financial accounts are prepared by management, the independent directors are responsible in ensuring the 
quality of the accounts. Quality financial reporting is the key success of a capital market whereby it relieves the 
fundamental asymmetry of information used in investment decisions. While many have shown that earnings 
performance is positively related to abnormal return of shares (Mahmoudi, Shirkavand & Salari, 2011; Ismail & 
Rahman, 2012), Houlthausen & Verrochia (1988) models investors’ view on the quality of earnings reported in 
financial accounts as the strength of coefficients between the earnings and abnormal return. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that independent directors’ tenure is significant and negatively related to earnings response 
coefficients, whereby independent directors’ tenure act as a moderating variable to the relationships between 














4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Previous studies are based on theory driven approach, which examines association between independent 
directors’ tenure and proxies of financial reporting quality (Sharma & Iselin, 2012; Rickling, 2014). This study 
used the market approach, whereby both investors’ perceptions and actions are examined together. Event study 
methodology was applied where the effect of independent directors’ tenure on the quality of financial reporting 
is examined based on investors’ reactions. This approach is adopted from Holthausen & Verrechia (1988)’s 
model of earnings response coefficient, where it examines investors’ reactions on the earnings reported in 
financial accounts at the time of release (announce). Low reliability of earnings perceived by investors is 
postulated to result in lower earnings response coefficients. Conceptually, the model to be tested will take the 
following form: 
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ERC = TENURE + AFEE + NAFEE + OPINION + BIG4 
Where; 
 ERC = Earnings response coefficients 
 TENURE = Independent directors’ tenure 
 AFEE = Audit fees 
 NAFEE = Non-audit services fees 
 OPINION = Audit opinion 
BIG4 = Auditor type 
 
The detailed model is based on event study methodology and semi-strong efficient market model by Fama 
(1970) which posits that investors will instantaneously adjust their expectations on assets’ value upon receiving 
new information which in turn is reflected instantaneously in asset prices. While many have shown that earnings 
performance is positively related to abnormal return of shares (Mahmoudi, Shirkavand & Salari, 2011; Ismail & 
Rahman, 2012), Holthausen & Verrechia (1988) hypothesized that the earnings response coefficient will 
increase with the perceived quality of the earnings by investors. Therefore, the effect of independent directors’ 
tenure on earnings response coefficient will be examined using the Ordinary Least Square regression and will 
take the following form: 
 
CAR = EP + EP*TENURE + EP*AFEE + EP*NAFEE + EP*OPINION + EP*BIG4 + ASSET + BETA 
Where; 
 CAR = Cumulative abnormal return 
 EP = Earnings performance 
 TENURE = Independent directors’ tenure 
 AFEE = Audit fees 
 NAFEE = Non-audit services fees 
 OPINION = Audit opinion 
BIG4 = Auditor type 
ASSET = Assets size 
BETA = Firm’s beta 
 
Significant and negative coefficient of EP*TENURE will provide support to the hypothesis that investors place 




Long tenure of independent directors has been a concern in many countries. Regulators view long tenure as 
impairing directors’ independence and has led to tenure’s limitation in many jurisdictions. However, the 
“comply or explain” model is favoured in many countries. Theories concerning long tenure of independent 
directors are contradictory. On one side, longer tenure is theorized as increasing an individual’s commitment 
towards an entity. Longer tenure has also been hypothesized to increase directors’ experience and specific 
knowledge about the corporation. On the other side, the friendliness hypothesis views long tenure as impairing 
directors’ independence through their close relationship with the management throughout the tenure. At the 
same time, having a new director has also been postulated to bring in fresh ideas and thus, safeguard against 
single minded group thinking. Meanwhile, the widely accepted independence model is that independence should 
not only be in the form of fact, but also in appearance. This study proposes that long tenure of independent 
directors shall result in lower reliability of earnings reported in financial accounts by the investors due to the 
concern on directors’ independence. Based on the earnings response coefficient model, it is argued that the 
interaction between long tenure and earnings performance have a significant negative relationship with 
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